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AbStrAct
The paper analyses the question of relations between the mayor and deputy-
mayor, particularly in terms of division of competences. The paper also deals 
with the standpoints of mayors and deputy-mayors regarding the institution 
of deputy-mayor. Furthermore, it verifies the assumption that the current 
regulatory framework regarding the appointment (and determination of 
competences) of the deputy-mayor is not entirely appropriate. Based on 
the analysis of objective data and research surveys among mayors and 
deputy-mayors of Slovenian municipalities, we analyse the problems of the 
functioning of those players. We learn that the current Slovenian legislation 
is favourable to consolidating the position and power of the mayor, because 
he/she can freely appoint and determine competences of the deputy-mayor(s).
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1 Introduction
the Slovenian system of local self-government features two primary 
municipal bodies: the municipal council and the mayor. Another important 
body is the supervisory committee (brezovšek et al., 2008, p. 169; Vlaj, 2007). 
the municipal council is the legislative body, whereas the mayor represents 
the apex of the local-level executive. For a long time, various typologies of 
local self-government systems have been proposed. they have been based 
on theory and/or empirical evidence and concern the horizontal division 
of power in local communities, that is, the relationships between the local 
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council, the mayor, and the executive officials (see Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006, 
pp. 29–41). Mouritzen & Svara have also devised a typology of the systems of 
local self-government, dealing with the horizontal division of power. When 
constructing the models, their considering is based on the hypothesis that 
the structural characteristics of a municipal administration in a certain state 
reflect the balance or compromise between three organisational principles, 
as follows: (1) rule by the people (the non-professional public), (2) political 
leadership, and (3) expertise. Even though Mouritzen & Svara take all three 
organisational principles into account, they set political leadership as the basis 
for their typology’s development. Namely, the fundamental question is how 
political power is acquired, maintained/preserved, wielded, and distributed. 
Political power depends on the degree of a political actor’s control – either of 
a single person or of a collective body – in two areas: firstly, to what extent one 
or more political actors control the municipal council, and secondly, to what 
extent one or more political actors control the execution of tasks. Formal 
structure can answer these two questions; however, Mouritzen & Svara warn 
us that the informal rules and norms existing in certain municipal bodies are 
important, too (Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006, p. 31).
Mouritzen & Svara study the depth of fusion and mixing of administration and 
politics as they analyse how political and administrative leaders influence and 
complement one another. Based on this analysis, they formulate four ideal-
type models of local-level government, as follows:
• The strong mayor model: The elected mayor controls the majority 
in the municipal council and is also in full charge of all executive 
functions. The director of municipal administration (henceforth, the 
DMA) performs tasks determined by the mayor; in this way, they are 
subordinated to the mayor, as the latter can fire and hire the director 
without prior consent of other politicians or political bodies. In addition 
to the DMA, mayors can also employ political advisors who help them 
with their functions. This form of government explicitly stresses the 
principle of political leadership. In this manner, rule by the people and 
expertise conform to strong political leadership.
• The committee leader model: One person is an obvious political leader 
of the municipality – they may (or may not) hold the title of mayor. The 
political leader may (or may not) control the local council. In this model, 
executive powers are shared. The political leader can be entrusted 
with certain executive functions, whereas the remaining functions fall 
within the jurisdiction of the collective body, that is, the permanent 
committee composed of elected politicians and the DMA. This model 
features a more even mixing of all three organisational principles than 
do the other models.
• The collective body model: The collective body, that is, the executive 
committee, is at the centre of decision-making and is responsible for 
all executive functions. The executive body is comprised of elected 
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local politicians and the mayor who chairs it. This model attributes the 
greatest emphasis to the principle of rule by the people (members 
of the collective body are elected by the people), with principles of 
political leadership and expertise conforming to it.
•	 The local council–manager model: In this case, all executive functions 
are held by the professional administrator (a city manager) appointed 
by the local council. The local council is in general control over politics, 
yet its cooperation in administrative matters is limited. The local council 
is a relatively small body; it is led by the mayor, who formally presides 
over it and is in charge of ceremonial/protocol functions. This model 
stresses the principle of expertise, whereas the principles of rule by the 
people and political leadership are limited (Mourtizen & Svara, 2002, 
pp. 55–56).
This article’s theoretical point of departure is represented by the strong 
mayor model, which assumes that the elected representative of the people 
possesses a great majority of executive power (or even the whole of it) and 
that they can freely select, appoint, and dismiss not only the highest senior 
civil servant, who is thus completely subordinated to the mayor;1 but also 
the	mayor	may	appoint	other	political	advisors,	 so	as	 to	offer	assistance	 in	
the execution of mayoral functions. We apply the selected model to Slovenia 
in order to analyse the relationship between the mayor and the deputy-
mayor(s) as political advisor(s). Hence, the primary focus of this article is on 
the relationships between the aforementioned actors in connection with the 
division of their competences and functions. Furthermore, by using empirical 
data, we analyse standpoints of mayors and deputy-mayors regarding the 
institution of the deputy-mayor and test the hypothesis stating that the 
current normative framework of the manner of selection of deputy-mayor(s) 
is inappropriate.
2 Mayor’s position in the Slovenian system of local self-
government
The mayor is the personal, individual body of the municipality, a holder of 
political function, elected by secret ballot in direct elections for a four-year 
term	 of	 office	 (Brezovšek	 in	 Kukovič,	 2012,	 p.	 125;	 Šmidovnik,	 2005).	 The	
right to vote is conferred upon voters who have permanent residence in the 
municipality	(Local	Self-Government	Act,	Article	42).	Suffrage	for	the	election	
of	a	mayor	is	identical	to	suffrage	for	election	of	the	municipal	council	(Kavčič	
& Grad, 2008, p. 392).2 The right to vote and to be elected as mayor is thus 
1	 See	also	Kukovič,	S.	et	al.	(2012).	Mayor:	The	Strongest	Player	in	Slovenian	Local	Government?.	
Czech Journal of Political Science	XIX(3),	pp.	218–233.
2 »The responsibility of the executive to the municipal council in pursuance of Article 3(2) of 
the Charter having to be viewed as a vital element of the domestic democratic organisation 
of	 local	 authorities	 (Rec.	 113/2002),	whereas	 the	 use	 of	 forms	 of	 direct	 democracy	 other	
than council elections is explicitly allowed, the election of the executive (and particularly of 
the mayor) directly by the population probably even becoming the most widespread form 
(Rec.	151/2004).	Each	such	reform	probably	represents	an	example	of	democratic	progress. 
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conferred upon every citizen who has the right to vote in elections to the 
municipal council. The Slovenian system of local self-government features a 
fairly simple candidacy procedure, since candidate-mayors can be proposed 
by political parties or groups of voters. If the latter is the case, the candidacy 
must be supported by the number of signatures equal to at least two per 
cent of all voters who cast their votes in the first round of the most recent 
mayoral election, yet this number must not be less than fifteen or more than 
2,500. Elections of mayor use a double-round absolute majority vote system; 
in other words, the candidate who receives the absolute majority of the votes 
cast is elected as the mayor. If none of the candidates receives the majority 
of the votes cast, a second round of elections is held for the two candidates 
who received the greatest number of votes in the preceding round. If two or 
more candidates receive the same highest number of votes or if two or more 
candidates receive the same second highest number of votes, the choice of 
candidates that will enter the second round of elections, which has to be held 
no later than 21 days after the first round, is determined by lot. The names 
of the two remaining candidates appear on the voting paper in the sequence 
reflecting the respective number of votes each received in the first round. 
If the number of votes received by each of them is equal, their sequence is 
determined by lot (Local Elections Act, Articles 106 & 107). The mayor can be 
elected either in regular elections or by-elections. Regular elections of mayors, 
which are held together with the regular elections to municipal councils, are 
summoned by the chairman of the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Slovenia; by-elections of the mayor are held in case a mayor’s term of office 
ceases prior to its formal expiry, for whatever reason(s), and are summoned 
by a municipal electoral commission (Kavčič & Grad, 2008, p. 392).
As mentioned, candidate-mayors can be determined by political parties and 
groups of voters. Non-partisan candidates can submit their candidacies if they 
are supported by groups of voters; the size of any such group is ultimately 
determined by the size of a municipality in which such a candidate is proposed. 
In this way, non-partisan candidates have a relatively simple way of asserting 
their passive suffrage, which is also confirmed by empirical data on four 
recent local elections. These reveal that non-partisan candidates have been 
successful, as they have achieved a high percentage of elected candidates 
relative to the number of candidacies submitted. Haček (2010, p. 43) concludes 
that the absolute numbers of mayors who, at least formally, have not run for 
the office as members of political parties have been constantly increasing; 
ever since the 1998 local elections, the greatest number of municipalities 
But the existence within the community of two poles which in principle enjoy identical levels 
of democratic legitimacy might well jeopardise the fundamental principle of the pre-eminence 
of the representative assembly in pursuance of Article 3(2) of the Charter, and possibly cause 
blockages within the municipal apparatus. It would therefore be appropriate to envisage 
introducing a system to minimise this risk, for example by providing for the possibility for the 
representative council to submit to a referendum a proposal for the dismissal of the executive 
(the mayor), or a system for submitting the composition of the council itself to the popular 
vote under certain circumstances.« (See document 20th Anniversary of the European Charter 
of Local Self-Government - CG (12) 6 Part II, Explanatory memorandum, Article 30.)
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have had mayors who have not been proposed by any political party (43 in the 
1998 local elections, 59 in 2002, 66 in 2006, and 70 in 2010 local elections).
In accordance with the organisation of the work of the municipality and the 
distribution of competences within the municipality’s tasks across municipal 
bodies, the function of the mayor is at the same time both executive and 
coordinative. The initial arrangement of the Local Self-Government Act 
envisaged a quite strict separation of the function of mayor from the function 
of municipal council; however, this proved to hamper the operation of local 
self-government, resulting in a tighter integration of both functions by 
subsequent amendments to the Act. Now, the mayor even has a direct link 
to the municipal council, as he or she represents it and summons its sessions 
and chairs them,3 but the person is not a member of it and has no right to 
vote. In addition, the mayor has various functions in relation to the municipal 
council as well as influence on its operation. On the one hand, the mayor’s 
responsibility is to take care of the implementation of decisions adopted by 
the municipal council;4 on the other, he or she has an important function of 
proposing an array of decisions to the municipal council5 and finally to oversee 
the lawfulness of the latter’s operation6 (Kaučič & Grad, 2008, pp. 369–370).
The mayor is the »master« of the municipality. Namely, by signing different 
contracts, inviting public tenders, rational and economical implementation 
of the budget, and consistent adherence to the principle of good diligence, 
all of this on a daily basis, the mayor takes care of the municipality’s assets 
and increases its value and quality. Their task is also to summon citizens’ 
assemblies and (when people’s lives and/or property are compromised) to 
adopt urgent measures7 (Prašnikar, 2000, p. 46).
3 See Article 33 of the Local Self-Government Act.
4 The mayor (1) provides for the publication of the statutes, decrees, and other general legal 
acts of the municipality; (2) provides for the annulment of conclusions and the execution of 
other decisions of the municipal council; (3) directs the work of the municipal administration 
with regard to the execution of decisions adopted by the municipal council; and (4) executes 
the decisions of the municipal council in accordance with their own powers and tasks (Local 
Self-Government Act, Article 33).
5 The mayor submits proposals of the following: (1) the draft budget of the municipality and 
the draft consolidated balance sheet, as well as other budgetary acts; (2) the establishment of 
bodies of the municipal administration and the body(-ies) of joint municipal administration; and 
(3) the appointment of deputy-mayors and the decision on (non-)professional performance of 
the function of deputy-mayor.
6 Within the scope of their competences, the mayor provides for the lawfulness of regulations 
and other decisions adopted by the municipal council, as follows: the mayor may (1) withhold 
the publication of a general legal act of the municipality; (2) submit a request to the 
Constitutional Court for the assessment of the compliance of a municipality’s general legal 
act with the Constitution and the law; (3) withhold the execution of the decisions adopted by 
the municipal council and notify the competent ministry of the unlawfulness of the decisions 
in question; and (4) initiate the procedure for the nullification of administrative decisions 
before the Administrative Court (Local Self-Government Act, Article 33; Catalogue of the 
Competences of Slovene Municipalities, 1997).
7 As commander of the civil protection, the mayor decides on all matters concerning the 
protection against environmental and other disasters and adopts the protection and rescue 
plans (Local Self-Government Act, Article 33; Catalogue of the Competences of Slovene 
Municipalities, 1997).
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However, the mayor’s most important function is to be the head of the 
municipal administration. The mayor is sovereign and practically untouchable 
throughout their entire term of office. Together with the municipal 
administration they head, the mayor can pursue a very independent policy 
in the municipality, regardless of the one pursued by the municipal council. 
However, this can cause trouble in case the elected mayor does not come 
from one of the parties that control a majority in the municipal council. To 
conclude, the mayor of a Slovenian municipality is thus the central figure of 
the Slovenian local self-government system, and being an individual, one-
person body, the mayor is the most noted figure among the citizens.
3 The relationship betweeen the mayor and the deputy-
mayor
Article 33.a of the Local Self-Government Act stipulates that the municipality 
has at least one deputy-mayor who is appointed (and dismissed) by the 
mayor.8 The mayor selects and appoints the deputy-mayor from among 
members of the municipal council, meaning that every deputy-mayor is 
previously directly elected to the municipal council. The deputy-mayor’s task 
is to assist the mayor with their work and to perform tasks belonging to the 
scope of the mayor’s competences for which the former is authorised by the 
latter. Also, the deputy-mayor substitutes for the mayor in case of the latter’s 
absence or non-attendance. During the time of absence, the deputy-mayor 
performs current tasks within the mayor’s jurisdiction plus those tasks the 
mayor additionally authorises them to execute.9
Since the Act contains no specific provision as to the number of deputy-
mayors (»at least one«), the municipality may have several deputy-mayors. If 
this is the case, the mayor is supplanted by the eldest deputy-mayor, unless 
one of them has been predetermined for this role by the mayor. A similar 
arrangement holds for the preliminary termination of a mayor’s term of office 
8 This legislative arrangement has been in force since 2005 (the amendment to the Act was 
published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 72/2005, on July 29, 2005). 
Prior to this, the Act had stipulated that the deputy-mayor was to be appointed and dismissed 
by the municipal council, acting on a proposal submitted by the mayor, who selected a 
member of the municipal council as candidate deputy-mayor (this amendment to the Act was 
published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 74/1998, on November 3, 
1998).
9 At this point, we stress the problématique of simultaneous performance of two functions 
by the deputy-mayor, since the deputy-mayor, as a single person, acts both as a legislator 
when acting as a member of the municipal council and as the executor of their own legislative 
decisions and solutions when performing the function of the deputy-mayor. This is obviously 
contentious from the standpoint of a clear division of competences and political power. 
Initially, the Local Self-Government Act (until subsequent amendments would be passed 
in 1998) was built upon a strict division of power as regards the bodies of the municipality 
and their mutual relationships – especially between the municipal council and the mayor 
(Grafenauer, 2000, p.  415). This is clearly stipulated as concerns the mayor: since they usually 
head the municipal administration, their participation in the decision-making of the municipal 
council would be unacceptable (Vlaj, 1998, p. 273; Vlaj, 2012b). However, this fact is simply 
overlooked in the case of the deputy-mayor, who can de facto substitute for the mayor and 
who perform tasks belonging to the scope of the latter’s competences, whilst retaining their 
right to vote in the municipal council.
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– in this case, the deputy-mayor performs the mayor’s function until a new 
person is elected to the office and assumes their position. If a municipality 
has several deputy-mayors, the mayor is replaced by the person who they 
themselves have selected, provided that the mayor is not dismissed. If the 
mayor does not select any of the deputy-mayors to temporarily hold their 
office or if the mayor is dismissed, the principle of seniority does not apply. 
Instead, the municipal council determines who of its members will perform 
this function (Local Self-Government Act, Article 33.a).
Just as the mayor and the members of the municipal council, the deputy-
mayor is a holder of political function in the municipality. Municipal politicians 
usually serve in their office non-professionally10 (this is true of all municipal 
councillors); however, the mayor has the choice of whether to perform their 
function professionally or non-professionally.11 In unison with the mayor, 
the deputy-mayor may also opt for (non-)professional performance of 
their function (Brezovšek & Kukovič, 2012, p. 197). Every holder of a local-
level political function is entitled to a salary, provided that they exercise 
the function professionally or at least to remuneration if they perform it 
in a non-professional mode. Salaries of professional holders of municipal 
political functions are determined in accordance with the act that regulates 
salaries in the public sector. If the deputy-mayor performs their function 
non-professionally, they are entitled to remuneration no higher than 50 % 
of the salary they would receive for professional performance of the office. 
The exact sum of the deputy-mayor’s remuneration is determined by the 
mayor, taking into account the scope of the deputy-mayor’s powers, whereby 
allowance for years of service is not considered (Local Self-Government Act, 
Article 34.a).
According to the Local Self-Government Act, every municipality should have 
at least one deputy-mayor. However, the data we acquired reveal that this 
is not the case.12 We found that 34 municipalities have no deputy-mayors 
at all; most such municipalities belong to the group of municipalities with a 
population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants (14 out of 53). As is evident 
from Table 1, most municipalities without deputy-mayors are small (up to 5,000 
inhabitants), whereas in the groups of large(r) or the largest municipalities 
(beyond 20,000, more than 30,000 and exceeding 100,000 inhabitants), there 
is no municipality that would not have at least one deputy-mayor.
10 The phrase »perform their function professionally« is used in sense that this is mayor’s/
deputy-mayor’s full-time job and that she/he is not employed somewhere else.
11 According to data from the Ministry of Justice and public administration, Local Self-
Government Department, there were 108 professional mayors in Slovenian municipalities in 
2009; in 2010, there were 111; in 2011, the number somewhat increased, to 128; in 2012, 
the data has so far been submitted by 182 municipalities, in which 104 mayors perform their 
functions professionally (Ministry of Justice and public administration, Local Self-Government 
Department, 2012).
12 Data collection took place in the second half of December 2011, by virtue of an inquiry 
regarding the number of deputy-mayors and the mode of their function (professional or non-
professional) sent to official e-mail addresses of Slovenian municipalities.
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With respect to the number of deputy-mayors appointed, most municipalities 
have a single deputy-mayor (109 out of 177, or 62%), followed by 
municipalities with two deputy-mayors (54), three deputy-mayors (11) and 
three urban municipalities (Kranj, Maribor and Ljubljana), which have four 
deputy-mayors each. Clearly, the number of deputy-mayors increases with 
the size of municipalities, according to the number of inhabitants. At the end 
of December 2011, a total of 262 municipal councillors held the office of 
deputy-mayors in Slovenian municipalities.13
Table 1: Municipalities according to the number of inhabitants and the 
number of their deputy-mayors
No. of 
Munici-
palities
Do not 
have
1 
Deputy-
Mayor
2 
Deputy-
Mayors
3 
Deputy-
Mayors
4 
Deputy-
Mayors
Number 
of 
Deputy- 
Mayors
Up to 3,000 
inhabitants 58 10 41 7 / / 55
From 3,001 
to 5,000 
inhabitants
53 14 28 10 1 / 51
From 5,001 
to 10,000 
inhabitants
47 7 25 13 2 / 57
From 10,001 
to 15,000 
inhabitants
19 1 6 10 2 / 32
From 15,001 
to 20,000 
inhabitants
17 2 6 7 2 / 26
From 20,001 
to 30,000 
inhabitants
8 / 2 4 2 / 16
From 30,001 
to 100,000 
inhabitants
7 / 1 3 2 1 17
Over 100,000 
inhabitants 2 / / / / 2 8
Total 211 34 109 54 11 3 262
Source: Research Project »Mayors and Deputy-Mayors« (2012).
In the earlier section on institutional basics, we mentioned that the deputy-
mayor – in consultation with the mayor – decides whether to perform their 
function professionally or non-professionally. The data show that Slovenian 
municipalities have 245 non-professional deputy-mayors (this represents 
94%) and only 17 deputy-mayors who perform their function professionally. 
Since we were interested in whether professional execution of the office of 
deputy-mayor is conditioned by the non-professional status of the mayor, we 
13 During our data collection, the new composition of the National Assembly was constituted, 
which included 7 deputy-mayors (all of them came from municipalities with over 10,000 
inhabitants), whose function expired as a consequence; in addition, the function of one 
deputy-mayor expired because that person was appointed to another posting that is also 
incompatible with the deputy-mayor function (if these persons were considered, the total 
number of deputy-mayors would be 270). These 8 deputy-mayors were excluded from the 
analysis and subsequently from the research itself.
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checked whether the mayors of these municipalities performed their function 
professionally or non-professionally. The results show that in 9 municipalities, 
the functions are performed professionally by both the mayor and (at least 
one)14 deputy-mayor; in the remaining 7 municipalities, the mayors are non-
professional and their respective deputy-mayors are professional. Hereby, 
we add the data on deputy-mayors as regards their sex. As is the case with 
mayors, the ratio is strongly in favour of men with deputy-mayors as well, as 
there are only 42 female deputy-mayors, which amounts to only 19%. As a 
curiosity, we may add that 7 female deputy-mayors perform their function 
professionally, from among 17 professional deputy-mayors in Slovenian 
municipalities, which represents 41% of such deputy-mayors.
Apart from objective statistics, we wanted to gather certain data on the 
relationships between mayors and deputy-mayors of Slovenian municipalities 
by virtue of the analysis of answers in survey questionnaires. For this purpose, 
we conducted a survey among current mayors and deputy-mayors of 
Slovenian municipalities and asked them about their standpoints regarding 
the institution of deputy-mayor.15 From among 114 mayors who participated 
in the survey, 100 (87.7%) responded16 that they had appointed (at least one) 
deputy-mayor;17 14 (12.3%) mayors claimed they had appointed no deputy-
mayors.18
14 According to our data, only the Urban Municipality of Maribor currently has two professional 
deputy-mayors.
15 Our research project »Mayors and Deputy-Mayors« was conducted by the Centre for the 
Analysis of Administrative-Political Processes and Institutions in February 2012 and covered 
mayors and deputy-mayors of Slovenian municipalities (it included 200 mayors and 262 deputy-
mayors; 11 mayors were subsequently excluded from our analyses as they were elected at 
parliamentarian elections in December 2011, which resulted in the expiry of their terms of 
office as mayors and by-elections of mayors were performed in March 2012; additionally, we 
excluded 8 deputy-mayors as well — see footnote 12). 114 completed questionnaires for 
mayors (57%) and 123 for deputy-mayors were returned (47%).
16 Question: »Did you appoint the deputy-mayor?« If »yes« the sub-question was: »How many?«; 
if »no« the sub-question was: »Why not?«.
17 Of these, 64% of mayors have one deputy-mayor, 29% two and 7% three deputy-mayors. The 
mayors who appointed more than one deputy-mayor were asked why they did so. Mayors 
were given several possible answers from which they had to pick the ones they agreed with. 
Most mayors (47.2%) agreed that this was a manner of overcoming political discord; 33.3% 
said this was due to the size of their municipalities or excessive scope of their work; 30.6% 
agreed with the statement that this was the more efficient division of work; 22.2% of mayors 
stated that the deputy-mayor was a matter of coalition treaty. However, 80.6% of mayors 
opposed the statement claiming that they had appointed several deputy-mayors because 
they were performing their function non-professionally.
18 The mayors who have appointed no deputy-mayors were asked about the reasons for such a 
decision. 21.4% of mayors responded that they had no available funds; 14.3% claimed there 
had been no suitable personnel to recruit from in the municipal council; and 64.3% of mayors 
answered that they had no deputy-mayor because they simply did not need one.
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Table 2: Powers of the mayor delegated to the deputy-mayor for execution 
(percent)
Mayors Deputy-mayors
yes no yes no
Complete powers in case of mayor’s absence 61.7 38.3 56.8 43.2
Representation and legal representation of the 
municipality 48.1 51.9 76.6 23.4
Representation of the municipal council plus 
summoning and chairing of its sessions 12.3 87.7 31.5 68.5
Submitting proposals of decrees and other 
general legal acts of the municipality 7.4 92.6 16.2 83.8
Execution of the decisions adopted by the 
municipal council 19.8 80.2 42.3 57.7
The heading of municipal administration 2.5 97.5 3.6 96.4
Providing for the publication of adopted general 
legal acts of the municipality and the protection 
of constitutionality and lawfulness in the 
operation of municipal bodies
1.2 98.8 10.8 89.2
Management of the municipality as a sui generis 
enterprise and acting in legal relationships of the 
municipality under property law
0 100.0 4.5 95.5
Public relations, summoning of citizens’ 
assemblies, summoning of local referenda and 
responding to citizens’ questions, initiatives, and 
proposals
8.6 91.4 40.5 59.5
Performance of delegated tasks and decision-
making in administrative matters belonging to 
the scope of municipality’s original and delegated 
(i.e., state) competences
7.4 92.6 6.3 93.7
Management of project groups for the most 
demanding, crucial projects and the largest 
investments
35.8 64.2 36.9 63.1
Execution and monitoring of the municipal 
budget 9.9 90.1 36.0 64.0
Tasks in the field of public tenders and 
procurement 17.3 82.7 24.3 75.7
Independent formulation of key systemic 
solutions and other materials of highest difficulty 4.9 95.1 15.3 84.7
Management of procedures and decision-making 
in matters of employment relationships (i.e., 
hiring personnel)
1.2 98.8 3.6 96.4
Other* 18.5 81.5 18.0 82.0
* Other: responses related to either: a) civil society activities, societies; b) the work and coordination of local 
communities and city quarters; c) various duties of protocol and presence at public events; d) management 
of projects for public water distribution and sewerage systems and management of civil servants’ work; e) 
the area of economy and assistance with small-scale projects intended for the municipalities’ development.
Source: Research Project »Mayors and Deputy-Mayors« (2012).
As far as delegation19 of powers is concerned, 80% of mayors who took part 
in the survey responded that they had delegated part of their powers to 
their deputy-mayors; on the other hand, the percentage of deputy-mayors 
who claimed that they had been delegated part of the mayor’s competences 
19 The term »delegation« is used in the sense that the mayor his/her tasks and responsibilities 
transfer to the deputy-mayor(s) for the execution/implementation.
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is even somewhat higher (91.1%).20 Survey participants were further asked 
to tell us the approximate share of delegated powers;21 79% of mayors and 
46.2% of deputy-mayors said this share was below 25%.22 Table 2 shows that 
most mayors delegate their competences as regards representation and legal 
representation of the municipality to the deputy-mayors (48.1% of mayors, 
according to mayors themselves and 76.6%, according to deputy-mayors 
included in the survey); however, none of the mayors claimed that they had 
authorised their deputy-mayor(s) to manage the municipality as a sui generis 
enterprise and act in legal relationships of the municipality under property 
law.
In addition to our interest in the percentage and type of mayors’ tasks 
deputy-mayors tend to execute, we asked both groups of actors where (if 
at all) their respective municipalities had stipulated the competences or 
tasks of their deputy-mayor(s).23 61.6% of mayors and 69.7% of deputy-
mayors responded that these competences were set down by the statutes 
of their municipalities; a relatively high percentage of both mayors (41.4%) 
and deputy-mayors (48.4%) said that these competences were set down by 
decisions on the appointment of individual deputy-mayors; this was followed 
by the rules of procedure of the municipal council (29.3% of mayors and 32% 
of deputy-mayors maintained that the competences of deputy-mayors were 
set down by this act). Less than one tenth of mayors and deputy-mayors who 
participated in the survey replied that the deputy-mayor’s competences were 
not stipulated anywhere.
Since there have been frequent allusions to the (non-)necessity of the 
institution of deputy-mayor, we asked both groups of survey participants 
a question that referred to this issue.24 Nearly 86% of mayors and 98% of 
deputy-mayors answered that the municipality undoubtedly required a 
deputy-mayor. Furthermore, 82% of mayors and 53% of deputy-mayors said 
that one deputy-mayor was necessary. 16% of mayors and 37% of deputy-
mayors claimed that two were required. 2.6% of mayors and 10.3% of deputy 
mayors thought that the municipality should have three deputy-mayors.25 
20 Question: »Does the mayor authorize deputy-mayor(s) to perform the tasks within mayor’s 
competence?«. If »yes« the sub-questions was: »What are these tasks?«.
21 Question: »The proportion of such tasks is?«. The possible answers were: »less than 25 
percent«; »between 25 and 50 percent«; »between 50 and 75 percent«; »more than 75 
percent« and »don’t know«.
22 In total, 97% of mayors said that the percentage of matters belonging to the scope of their 
competences they had delegated to the deputy-mayor was less than 50%; on the other hand, 
84 % of deputy-mayors estimated the share of these matters to be below 50%.
23 Question: »The competences or tasks of deputy-mayor(s) were set down...«. The possible 
answers were: »competences were set down by the statutes«; »competences were set down 
by decisions on the appointment of individual deputy-mayor«; »the competences of deputy-
mayors were set down by the rules of procedure of the municipal council«; »competences 
were not stipulated anywhere« and »other«.
24 Question: »Does the municipality need the deputy-mayor?« If »yes« the sub-question was: 
»How many?«.
25 Mayors and deputy-mayors were given some suggestions as to what determines the number 
of deputy-mayors in a certain municipality. They expressed their agreement with each of the 
suggestions as follows: the size of a municipality (52.7% of mayors and 65.5% of deputy-mayors 
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At the same time, over 64% of mayors and 45% of deputy-mayors agreed that 
the function of the deputy-mayor should be non-professional; alternatively, 
only 4% of mayors and 12% of deputy-mayors stated the opposite, that is, 
were in favour of the professional mode of this function; 29.5% of mayors and 
43% of deputy-mayors thought that the mode of execution of the deputy-
mayor’s function should depend on the (non-)professional status of the 
mayor.26
It is also interesting that just over 78% of mayors and almost 84% of deputy-
mayors said that the deputy-mayor’s holding a double function (the legislative 
and the executive) was acceptable; the statement that the deputy-mayor 
should give up the function in the municipal council was supported by 13% 
of mayors and by less than 7% of deputy-mayors.27 At the end of our survey, 
there was a question for deputy-mayors, asking whether or not they were 
satisfied with the sum of remuneration they received for their work,28 and 
65% of deputy-mayors said they were and agreed with the payment they 
were receiving,29 which hardly comes as a surprise, as this represents extra 
income for them.30
4 Conclusion
This article deals with two actors within Slovenian municipalities, namely, 
the mayor and the deputy-mayor. Its primary interest is in the relationships 
between the mayor and the deputy-mayor, especially from the aspect of 
division of powers. We can conclude that the mayor is free to delegate (or 
not) tasks from the scope of their own competences to the deputy-mayor, 
without being obliged to take any consultations with other municipal (or 
state) authorities. In this manner, tasks and competences of deputy-mayors 
vary significantly across Slovenian municipalities. Moreover, despite the fact 
that the legislator envisioned that every municipality must have at least one 
agreed with this statement); available funds (9.7% of mayors and 12.6% of deputy-mayors); 
scope of work (57% of mayors and 56.3% of deputy-mayors); the mode of holding the term of 
office of the mayor (non-professional) and potential other deputy-mayors (53.8% of mayors 
and 52.9% of deputy-mayors); and balance of power in the municipal council (22.6% of mayors 
and 10.9% of deputy-mayors).
26 Question: »Do you think that the deputy-mayor(s) should exercise its function:«; possible 
answers: »professional«; »non-professional«; »depend on the (non-)professional status of the 
mayor«; »don’t know«.
27 Question: »Do you think that deputy-mayor’s holding a double function (the legislative and 
the executive) is acceptable?«
28 Question: »Are you satisfied with the sum of remuneration you receive for your work?«
29 Remuneration for the non-professional mayor includes attendance fees for attending the 
sessions of the municipal council and membership in its committees and commissions. These 
rewards are categorised under the budgetary term of »municipal expenditures of system’s 
operation« (including all those expenditures related to the maintenance of the system or the 
operation of the municipality, i.e., its bodies – the mayor, municipal councillors, municipal 
administration, etc.) and even though these costs vary widely across municipalities, they 
typically represent around one fifth of all budgetary expenditures of an average Slovenian 
municipality (Brezovnik & Oplotnik, 2012, p. 283).
30 As a curiosity, we mention a comment made by one of the deputy-mayors who took part in the 
survey, claiming his reward to be too high with respect to the duties he performs as a deputy-
mayor.
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deputy-mayor, there are 34 municipalities whose situation remains against 
the law, because their mayors have not appointed deputy-mayors.31
However, we want to give special emphasis to what we consider a quite 
inappropriate legislation regarding the very method of appointment of the 
deputy-mayor and the manner in which their competences are set down. As 
we have already said, the deputy-mayors are autonomously appointed and 
dismissed by the mayor; therefore it is urgent to consider a different selection 
method.
The law stipulates that there has to be at least one deputy-mayor, whilst giving 
no maximum number of deputy-mayors and also lacking criteria that would 
justify (if at all) more than one deputy-mayor per municipality. Therefore, the 
authors propose a reflection on different methods of selection, such as direct 
election of the deputy-mayor by citizens, that is, by voters (and from among 
them), or election of the deputy-mayor by the municipal council. The current 
legislation is all too favourable to the consolidation of the mayor’s position and 
power, as they can (and in a majority of cases, they do) appoint their followers 
to the functions of the deputy-mayor, who (often uncritically) support the 
mayor in every aspect.32 Apart from a more appropriate arrangement of 
selection of the deputy-mayor, clear delineation of competences of each of 
the two actors is necessary, because the more exactly the responsibilities and 
relationships are defined, the less room there is for confusion and potentially 
contentious situations.
In conclusion we also want to draw attention to the general problématique 
of authorising the deputy-mayors, since in this way, legitimacy, which voters 
confer upon the directly elected politician (i.e., the mayor) is lost. So what 
is then the case with accountability? Is authorisation of mayors for the 
execution of certain competences (according to the legislation currently in 
force for the appointment of deputy-mayors) acceptable and admissible? In 
this regard, the deputy-mayors unquestionably represent interesting aspect 
worth researching.
31 Data as of January 2012.
32 We augment this claim with the data acquired by this year’s survey among mayors and deputy-
mayors, in which 87% of mayors and 90% of deputy-mayors who took part claimed the current 
method of the deputy-mayor’s selection to be inappropriate. Question: »What do you think 
about current method of the deputy-mayor’s selection?« The possible answers were: »it is 
appropriate«; »deputy-mayor should be chosen among citizens«; »deputy-mayor should be 
elected by municipal council«; »deputy-mayor should be directly elected«; »don’t know«.
86 Administration, Vol. X, No. 4/1012
Simona Kukovič, Vladimir Prebilič
Simona Kukovič is a young research fellow at the Centre for the Analysis of 
Administrative-Political Processes and Institutions and a PhD student at the 
Faculty of Social Sciences, programme Public administration. Her research focus 
encompasses regional and local self-government, administrative and political 
processes and institutions.
Vladimir Prebilič, PhD, is Associate Professor at the Chair for Defence Studies 
of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana. He teaches the 
following subjects: Military History, Geography for Defence Studies, Military 
Logistics, Theory of Military Tactics and Defence Economics. His research includes 
topics from military history and patriotism. From 2010 he is also the mayor of the 
Municipality Kočevje. 
87Uprava, letnik X, št. 4/1012
The Relationship between the Mayor and Deputy-Mayor 
in the Slovenian Local Self- Government System
References
•	 (2005).	20th Anniversary of the European Charter of Local Self-Government – CG 
(12) 6 Part II, Explanatory memorandum.	The	Congress	of	Local	and	Regional	
Authorities,	12th	Plenary	Session,	20	September	2005.	Strasbourg.	retrieved	
in	January	2013,	from	https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=889917&Site=DC
•	 (2012).	Research	Project	»Mayors	and	Deputy-Mayors«.	Ljubljana:	Centre	for	
the	Analysis	of	Administrative-Political	Processes	and	Institutions,	Faculty	of	
Social	Sciences.
•	 Brezovnik,	B.,	&	Oplotnik,	Ž.	(2012).	An	Analysis	of	the	Applicable	System	of	
Financing	the	Municipalities	in	Slovenia.	Lex localis	10(3),	277–295.
•	 Brezovšek,	M.,	&	Kukovič,	S.	(2012).	Organizacija lokalne oblasti v Sloveniji.	
Ljubljana:	Faculty	of	Social	Sciences.	
•	 Brezovšek,	M.,	Haček,	M.,	&	Zver,	M.	(2008).	Organizacija oblasti v Sloveniji.	
Ljubljana:	Faculty	of	Social	Sciences.
•	 Grafenauer,	B.	(2000).	Lokalna samouprava na Slovenskem: teritorialno-
organizacijske structure.	Maribor:	Law	Faculty.
•	 Haček,	M.	(2010).	Non-Partisan	Local	Actors	as	the	Element	of	Absorbed	Local	
Democracy?.	Romanian Journal of Political Science	10(1),	38–51.
•	 Heinelt,	H.,	&	Hlepas,	N.	K.	(2006).	Typologies	of	Local	Government	Systems.	
In:	Bäck,	H.,	Heinelt,	H.,	&	Magnier,	A.	(Eds.),	The European Mayor, Political 
Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy	(21–42).	Wiesbaden:	VS	
Verlag	für	Sozialwissenschaften.
•	 Kaučič,	I.,	&	Grad,	F.	(2008).	Ustavna ureditev Slovenije.	Ljubljana:	GV	Založba.
•	 Kukovič,	S.,	Haček,	M.,	&	Grabner,	A.	(2012).	Mayor:	The	Strongest	Player	in	
Slovenian	Local	Government?.	Czech Journal of Political Science	XIX(3):	218–
233.
•	 Local Self-Government Act	(Official	Consolidated	Version)	(ZLS-
UPB2).	Official	Gazette	of	the	Republic	of	Slovenia,	No.	94/2007.	
Retrieved	in	November	2012,	from	http://www.uradni-list.si/1/objava.
jsp?urlid=200794&stevilka=4692.
•	 Ministry	of	Justice	and	public	administration,	Local	Self-Government	
Department	(2012).	Municipalities.	Retrieved	in	November	2012,	from	http://
www.mpju.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/lokalna_	samouprava/obcine/.
•	 Mouritzen,	P.	E.,	&	Svara,	J.	H.	(2002).	Leadership at the Apex; Politicians 
and Administrators in Western Local Governments.	Pittsburgh:	University	of	
Pittsburgh	Press.
•	 Prašnikar,	A.	(2000).	Župan,	direktor	občinske	uprave,	občinska	uprava.	In:	Vlaj,	
S.	(Ed.),	Župan in občina	(45–59).	Ljubljana:	Inštitut	za	lokalno	samoupravo.
•	 Šmidovnik,	J.	(1995).	Lokalna samouprava.	Ljubljana:	Cankarjeva	založba.
•	 Vlaj,	S.	(1998).	Lokalna samouprava – občine in pokrajine.	Ljubljana:	Faculty	of	
Social	Sciences.
•	 Vlaj,	S.	(2007).	Local	self-government	in	Slovenia:	current	situation	and	
perspective.	In:	Kovač,	P.	(Ed.),	First International Symposium on the 
Development of Public Administration in South East Europe,	14-15	June	2007,	
Ljubljana,	Slovenia.	Ljubljana:	Faculty	of	Administration.	
•	 Vlaj,	S.	(2012a).	The	system	of	local	self-government	in	Slovenia	with	a	special	
emphasis	on	the	status	of	the	capital	city	Ljubljana.	Hrvatska i komparativna 
javna uprava	12(3),	675–694.	Retrieved	in	January,	from	http://en.iju.hr/ccpa/
ccpa/downloads_files/02%20Vlaj.pdf.
•	 Vlaj,	S.	(2012b).	Etična	načela	v	lokalnem	javnem	življenju.	In:	Kečanović,	B.	
(Ed.),	Javna etika in integriteta: odgovornost za skupne vrednote: integriteta, 
odgovornost, vladavina prava	(211–231).	Ljubljana:	Komisija	za	preprečevanje	
korupcije.
88 Administration, Vol. X, No. 4/1012
Simona Kukovič, Vladimir Prebilič
Povzetek
OdnOs med županOm in pOdžupanOm v 
slOvenskem sistemu lOkalne samOuprave
Ključne besede:  župan, podžupan, odnos, kompetence, občine, Slovenija
V slovenskem sistemu lokalne samouprave imamo dva poglavitna občinska 
organa, to sta občinski svet in župan, poleg njiju pa v občinah deluje še nadzorni 
odbor. Občinski svet je zakonodajno telo, medtem ko župan predstavlja vrh 
izvršilne veje lokalne oblasti. Na podlagi teorij in/ali empiričnih izkustev se že 
vrsto let se pojavljajo različne tipologije sistemov lokalnih samouprav, ki se 
ukvarjajo s horizontalno delitvijo moči v lokalnih skupnostih, torej z razmerji 
med lokalnim svetom, županom in izvršilnimi uradniki. Tudi Mouritzen in 
Svara sta oblikovala tipologijo sistemov lokalnih samouprav, usmerjeno na 
horizontalno delitev moči. Pri oblikovanju modelov je njuno razmišljanje 
temeljilo na hipotezi, da strukturne značilnosti občinske uprave v neki državi 
odražajo ravnovesje ali kompromis med tremi organizacijskimi načeli, in sicer 
med (1) vladanjem ljudstva (nestrokovne javnosti), (2) političnim vodstvom 
in (3) strokovnostjo. Kljub temu, da Mouritzen in Svara upoštevata vsa tri 
organizacijska načela, postavljata politično vodstvo kot izhodišče za razvoj 
tipologije. Temeljno vprašanje je namreč, kako se politična moč pridobiva, 
vzdržuje/ohranja, izvaja in deli. Politična moč je odvisna od stopnje nadzora 
političnega akterja – bodisi ene osebe bodisi kolektivnega organa – na 
dveh prizoriščih. Prvič, v kolikšni meri nadzoruje ena oseba ali več političnih 
akterjev občinski svet in drugič, v kolikšni meri eden ali več političnih akterjev 
nadzoruje izvrševanje nalog. Formalna struktura nam lahko odgovori na 
zastavljeni vprašanji, vendar avtorja opozarjata, da so (vsaj tako ali pa še bolj) 
pomembna vzpostavljena neformalna pravila in norme v določenih občinskih 
organih. Mouritzen in Svara sta torej proučevala globino spajanja in mešanja 
uprave in politike, saj sta analizirala, kako politični in upravni voditelji vplivajo 
drug na drugega ter kako se dopolnjujejo. Na podlagi analize sta izoblikovala 
štiri idealne modele vladanja na lokalni ravni, in sicer model močnega 
župana, model vodje odbora, model kolektivnega telesa, model lokalni svet 
– menedžer. 
Teoretsko izhodišče prispevka predstavlja model močnega župana, ki upošteva, 
da ima izvoljeni predstavnik ljudstva veliko večino (ali pa celo vso) izvršilne 
oblasti ter da prosto izbira, razrešuje in zaposluje ne samo najvišjega javnega 
uslužbenca, ki je tako povsem podrejen županu; ampak lahko tudi imenuje še 
druge politične svetovalce, ki mu pomagajo pri opravljanju njegovih funkcij. 
Izbrani model smo aplicirali na Slovenijo in analizirali odnos med županom 
in podžupanom kot političnim svetovalcem. V prispevku nas zlasti zanima 
razmerje med omenjenima akterjema v povezavi z delitvijo njunih pristojnosti 
in funkcij. Poleg tega smo na podlagi empiričnih podatkov analizirali stališča 
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županov in podžupanov do instituta podžupana ter preverjali domnevo, da 
aktualni normativni okvir glede načina izbire podžupana ni ustrezen.
S pomočjo analize zakonodaje, objektivnih podatkov in podatkov izvedene 
empirične raziskave smo ugotovili, da lahko župan samostojno, ne samo 
imenuje podžupana/e, ampak lahko na njega/njih svobodno in brez 
potrebnega posvetovanja z drugimi občinskimi (ali državnimi) organi prenaša 
(ali pa ne) zadolžitve iz sklopa županovih pristojnosti. Tako se naloge in 
pristojnosti podžupanov med občinami precej razlikujejo. Še več, ugotovimo, 
da kljub temu, da je zakonodajalec predvidel, da ima vsaka občina najmanj 
enega podžupana, obstaja kar nekaj občin, ki delujejo v nasprotju z zakonom, 
saj župan ni imenoval niti enega podžupana. 
Še posebej pa želimo izpostaviti – po našem mnenju – dokaj neustrezno 
zakonodajo glede samega imenovanja podžupana ter določitve pristojnosti 
tega akterja. Kot smo zapisali, podžupana avtonomno imenuje in razrešuje 
župan, zato bi bilo nujno potrebno razmisliti o drugačnem načinu izbire. 
Zakon določa najmanj enega podžupana, ne predvidi pa najvišjega števila 
podžupanov, kot tudi ne kriterijev, po katerih bi lahko imela občina več kot 
enega župana (če sploh). Avtorja zato predlagava premislek o drugačnih 
načinih izbire, kot sta na primer neposredna volitev podžupana s strani 
občanov (in izmed občanov) ali izvolitev podžupana s strani občinskega sveta. 
Trenutna zakonodaja je namreč preveč naklonjena utrjevanju pozicije in moči 
župana, saj lahko (in v večini primerov je tako) na mesto podžupana imenuje 
svoje pripadnike, ki ga v vseh pogledih (običajno nekritično) podpirajo.1 
Poleg primernejše ureditve izbire podžupana pa je treba jasno določiti tudi 
njegove pristojnosti, kajti natančneje so zadolžitve in odnosi definirani, manj 
je prostora za nejasnosti in možne sporne situacije.
Ob koncu prispevka smo želeli tudi opozoriti na splošno problematiko 
pooblaščanja podžupanov, saj se s tem izgublja legitimnost, ki jo volivci podelijo 
neposredno voljenemu, torej županu. Kako je potem z odgovornostjo? Ali je 
pooblaščanje za izvajanje določenih pristojnosti (glede na aktualno zakonodajo 
imenovanja podžupanov) sploh dopustno in sprejemljivo? Tudi s tega vidika 
je po našem mnenju analiziranje odnosa župan in podžupan ter premislek o 
morebitni spremembi zakonodaje še kako pomemben in ne nazadnje tudi 
nujen.
1 Slednje naj podkrepimo s podatki iz letošnje raziskave med župani in podžupani, kjer kar 87 % 
županov in 90 % podžupanov meni, da trenutni način izbire podžupana ni primeren (Raziskava 
»Župani in podžupani«, 2012).
